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Critical Notice
Having it Both Ways: HybridTheories and Modern Metaethics,
Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge (eds.),
Oxford University Press USA, 2014, xvi + 302 pp.
Alex Silk
A dialogue between a saint and a sinner:
“This rich collection features cutting-edge work on an exciting recent approach
in metaethics: hybrid theories of normative language and thought. The volume,
which includes papers bymany of hybridism’smost prominent advocates and critics,
is essential for people working in metaethics. Anyone with interests in expressive
language or practical thought more generally would benefit from it.”
“Pshaw. There is no category of reader for whom I would recommend this vol-
ume. If you are ametaethicist working on hybrid theories: either you participated in
the conference from which the volume resulted, or you are already familiar with the
contributors’ previous work (with some exceptions, there isn’t that much new). If
you are a young researcher interested in getting introduced to the field: most of the
papers assume familiarity with the authors’ previouswork. And if you are a specialist
in a more general related area, like philosophy of language or mind, and are inter-
ested in seeing applications to the case of normative language or thought: just don’t.
One might have expected, for a field birthed out of developments in philosophy of
language on non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, to find references to such
developments. Ditto for work in psychology (think: primacy of affect, dual-process
model, etc.). Yet seek, and you shall not find. In principle, hybridism opens up
the potential for exciting advancements in our more general understanding of (e.g.)
linguistic expressives, implicature, projective content, and the nature and structure
of motivation, among other things. Such advancements may need to await future
research.”
We will return to this “tale of two assessments” (§4). To foreshadow: neither is
Faithful and True. Meanwhile, a mean between two extremes…
Hybrid metaethical theories claim (i) that “moral claims express both belief-like
and desire-like mental states,” or (ii) that “moral judgments are constituted by both
belief-like and desire-like components” (ix). The strategy is to appeal to the belief-
like component to avoid pure expressivism’s putative problems with embedding and
logic (Frege-Geach), and to appeal to the desire-like component to avoid pure cog-
nitivism’s putative problems capturing the connection betweenmoral judgment and
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motivation. On the language side, many theories appeal to pejoratives as a precedent
for expressions having both truth-conditional and attitudinally expressive aspects of
meaning. Examining the aptness of this analogywill provide a natural foray into var-
ious core issues in the volume. I will focus primarily on Mark Schroeder’s and Guy
Fletcher’s contributions. I close with brief remarks on the remaining papers.
1. Pejoratives and projection
Following Schroeder in his chapter, let’s consider ‘cheesehead’ as our candidate pejo-
rative (274).1 Uttering (1) conventionally (i) describes Mark as being fromWiscon-
sin, and (ii) expresses some sort of negative attitude toward people fromWisconsin
(or toward Mark merely because he is fromWisconsin).
(1) Mark is a cheesehead. (281)
Pejoratives can also embed in complex constructions and figure in valid arguments,
as in (2).
(2) a. If Mark cannot drive in traffic, then Mark is a cheesehead.
b. Mark cannot drive in traffic.
c. ∴Mark is a cheesehead. (280–81)
Pejoratives thus provide hybrid theorists with a license for optimism. For everyone
needs an account of the dual descriptive+attitudinal meaning of pejoratives. The
hope is then that we can apply our best semantics for pejoratives to paradigmatic
normative terms in responding to the Frege-Geach problem.
This hope is short-lived. There are clear linguistic differences between pejora-
tives— and other types of linguistic expressives (honorifics, expressive attributive
adjectives, certain discourse particles)— and words such as ‘wrong’. The expres-
sive content of pejoratives projects: it tends to be regarded as a commitment of the
speaker even when the pejorative is embedded under entailment-canceling opera-
tors, as in Family-of-Sentences examples:
(3) a. Mark isn’t a cheesehead.
b. Mark might be a cheesehead.
c. Is Mark a cheesehead?
1Readers for whom ‘cheesehead’ is less well-attested may wish to substitute an alternative pejo-
rative. All occurrences of pejoratives here are mentioned, not used.
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Further, the expressive content needn’t contribute to the expression’s local context: it
needn’t contribute to the conventional contents of embedded clauses, like the com-
plements of belief-predicates.
(4) [Context: Wehate people fromWisconsin, though Steve has nothing against
them. We want to know where Mark is from. You leave to ask Steve. When
you get back, I ask you what he thinks. You say:]
Steve thinks Mark is a cheesehead.
(5) Steve thinks that cheesehead Mark is a great guy.
The expressive content of ‘cheesehead’ in (4)–(5) isn’t taken to characterize Steve’s
state of mind. It projects simply as a commitment of the speaker.
These projective properties of pejoratives are well-known.2 Hence it is puzzling
why pejoratives were thought to provide a promising model for normative terms
generally. ‘Wrong’ contrasts with ‘cheesehead’ with respect to both of the above
properties (which isn’t to say that either moral terms or linguistic expressives form
homogeneous linguistic classes; they don’t). This is evident on various ways of spec-
ifying the expressive content of ‘wrong’.
First, consider projection in Family-of-Sentences examples. Treating the ex-
pressed negative attitude as directed toward the subject of the predicate generates
incorrect predictions. Utterances of (6) wouldn’t typically be regarded as commit-
ting the speaker to (something like) disapproval of killing.
(6) a. Killing isn’t wrong.
b. Killing might be wrong.
c. Is killing wrong?
Treating the expressed attitude as a general attitude toward things, whatever they
are, that satisfy the (alleged) descriptive, truth-conditional content of ‘wrong’— a
common move among hybrid theorists3—won’t work either. The following aren’t
infelicitous:
(7) [Context: Nihilist says:]
Killing isn’t wrong, since nothing is right or wrong.
2See, e.g., Potts 2005, 2007, McCready 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2013, and references therein.
Note that a content’s having local effect under attitude verbs is compatible with its also projecting
(e.g., with the contents of factive attitude complements).
3See Schroeder 2009 for discussion of the relevant arguments.
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(8) [Context: Budding moral skeptic says:]
I’m not sure if anything is right or wrong. But killing might be wrong. If
anything is wrong, it’s that.
(9) [Context: Budding moral skeptic says:]
I’m not sure if anything is right or wrong. But if anything is wrong, it’s
killing. Is killing wrong?
It’s hard to hear analogous examples with pejoratives as failing to commit the speaker
to the relevant negative attitude.
Second, it’s hard to hear a belief ascription with ‘wrong’ as committing anyone
other than the subject to the negative attitude, whether particular or general. Utter-
ances of (10) are generally anomalous.
(10) #That whole community thinks killing is wrong, but they’re all for it.
The (alleged) expressive content of ‘wrong’ systematically contributes to local con-
tent and fails to project in attitude contexts.
There are additional contrasts. For instance, the expressive content of pejoratives
is typically infelicitous as the answer to a question, and continues to projects when
what is at-issue is the appropriateness of the relevant attitude.
(11) A: Is Mark to be despised merely because he’s fromWisconsin?
B: #Well, he isn’t a cheesehead.
B’s denial in (11) cannot be used to communicate a negative answer to A’s question.
By contrast, B’s response in (12) is perfectly felicitous (stiltedness aside).
(12) A: Is stealing to be disapproved of merely because it doesn’t maximize
happiness?
B: Well, it isn’t wrong.
The contrasting behavior in attitude ascriptions of pejoratives and moral terms
was pressed in Schroeder’s 2009 comprehensive critical discussion of hybridism. Yet
the extent of the linguistic differences don’t seem to have been adequately appreci-
ated. For instance, Daniel Boisvert’s paper treats the expressive content of ‘wrong’ as
“semantically and logically distinct” (44); sentence (13) is “rendered” (43) as (14),
where F is the descriptive property picked out by ‘wrong’.
(13) If insulting others is wrong, I won’t insult others.
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(14) If insulting others is F, then I won’t insult others; down with F-things!
(43)
Boisvert cites various linguistic expressives as precedents to justify this move (44–
45). The differences in projection properties go unnoticed.
David Copp is more circumspect concerning the aptness of the analogy to pe-
joratives. He explicitly qualifies that he is merely taking pejoratives as a “model”
for expressions which conventionally both denote ordinary properties and express
desire-like attitudes. Copp’s care in this regard is refreshing. Yet there is something
unsatisfying when perhaps the best one can say about a volume’s treatment of a di-
alectically central issue is a case where the author avoids addressing it.
Schroeder’s paper— characteristically clear and systematic— is essentially a re-
ply piece to his 2009 article. The conclusion there was that, in light of the sorts of
projection differences under attitude verbs discussed above, modeling the meaning
of moral terms on analogy with pejoratives is problematic. The current paper argues
that a more promising model for (cognitivist) hybrid theories is ‘but’. On one com-
mon view, although the truth-conditions of (15) are that Shaq is huge and Shaq is
agile, utterances of (15) also conventionally express that there is a contrast between
(Shaq’s) being huge and (Shaq’s) being agile.
(15) Shaq is huge but agile. (274)
This contrastive implication arguably projects in Family-of-Sentences contexts; how-
ever, unlike the projective content of pejoratives, it systematically has local effect un-
der attitude verbs. (I use ‘implication’ as neutral among entailment, presupposition,
implicature, etc.)
(16) Sally thinks Shaq is huge but agile. (#But she sees no contrast between huge-
ness and agility.)
Schroeder is right that “there is nothing fundamentally strange about secondary
contents affecting the core, ‘truth-conditional’ content of attitude verbs” (274). The
semantic status of the contrastive implication associated with ‘but’ is contentious.
But there are other examples that would fit the bill— e.g., the complement impli-
cation of factive attitude verbs (‘know’), the prejacent implication of ‘only’, or the
prestate implication of change-of-state verbs (‘stop’).⁴
Schroeder outlines a “simple, flexible model for secondary contents” on which
sentences are “assigned to a triple of semantic values: a core content, a primary set,
⁴See Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) ‘Class C’ of backgrounded projective contents.
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and a secondary set” (277). The “core content” is the primary, truth-conditional
content. The primary and secondary sets represent any “secondary contents,” i.e.
projective implications; the primary set represents projective contents which have
local effect under attitude verbs (cf ‘but’), and the secondary set represents projective
contents which don’t (cf ‘cheesehead’). Schroeder is clear in describing the proposed
framework as “simple” (277). There is nothing wrong with using a simple model
if the aim is simply to show that a language in which certain projective contents
systematically have local effect is possible. (Should we have thought otherwise?) A
concern, though, is that Schroeder’s ensuing worry for (cognitivist) hybrid theories
turns on the very features of the model that make it not just simple, but simplistic.
Briefly, Schroeder’s worry is as follows. The following argument is “inference-
licensing”: accepting the premises commits one to accepting the conclusion.
(17) a. What Caroline believes is true.
b. What Caroline believes is that stealing is wrong.
c. ∴ Stealing is wrong. (289)
Accepting the conclusion, according to hybridism, commits one to a certain desire-
like attitude— call it ‘D’. But accepting premise 1 needn’t involve having any partic-
ular desire-like attitude. So, it must be premise 2 which commits one to D.This can
only happen, in Schroeder’s framework, if D figures in the secondary set. So, for any
moral term, one must stipulate that the desire-like members of primary sets also be
in the secondary sets. This seems ad hoc.
Schroeder worry gets its bite from the sharp distinction between primary and
secondary sets, i.e. projective contents which contribute to the truth-conditions of
attitude ascriptions and projective contents which don’t. But it is hard to imagine
that our best semantics for a natural language such as English will include such a
distinction. Many expressions only sometimes have local effect under attitude verbs.
Pejoratives and other expressives themselves are arguably in this camp:
(18) I don’t have anything against people fromWisconsin. But Steve, who does,
thinks Mark is the worst cheesehead he knows.
(cf. Schlenker 2003: ex. 109b)
(19) My friend said Professor X gave him a bad grade again. I don’t have any-
thing against X, but my friend is pissed. He thinks the damn guy (/the jerk)
always favours long papers. (cf. Harris & Potts 2009: ex. 16)
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Though it’s contentious how to capture such cases,⁵ there are other uncontentious
examples. Consider the following contrasting examples with ‘too’:
(20) [Context: We’re cousins, out at a party.]
My parents think you’re home in bed. They think I’m in bed too.
(local effect)
(21) [Context: My parents don’t know anything about you. You say you’re home
in bed. I say:]
My parents think I’m in bed too. (no local effect)
Which set(s) includes the projective implication of ‘too’ that there is a salient alter-
native true proposition? It cannot be the primary set, since this would incorrectly
treat (21) as ascribing to my parents beliefs about your whereabouts. And it cannot
be the secondary set, since this would incorrectly treat (20) as inconsistent with the
common ground. In reply Schroeder might treat the secondary set as including pro-
jective contents that don’t necessarily have local effect, and put the projective impli-
cationwith ‘too’ there. But that won’t do for Schroeder’s purposes, for it is by treating
the elements of secondary sets as invariably projecting from attitude contexts that
Schroeder captures the validity of (17)-style arguments with ‘cheesehead’ (289).
Theupshot, I take it, is thatwe should never have encoded a binary primary/secondary-
set distinction into the semantics. Butwithout such a distinction, Schroeder’s ad hoc-
ness worry (at least as presented) seems unmotivated. There has been substantial
recent empirical and technical work on the logic/semantics of projective contents.⁶
The issues are bewilderingly complex. Initiating a dialectic with Schroeder’s “sim-
ple, flexible framework for thinking about secondary contents” (277) seems like a
step in the wrong direction.
What should the hybrid theorist say about arguments like (17)? General issues
concerning propositional anaphora and local effects provide independent grounds
for questioning the validity of the inference schema ‘What S believes is true’; ‘what
S believes is P’: ‘P’ (cf. Silk 2014: §4.2.4). Take a Donnellan-style case: We are talk-
ing about whether Steve knows that Mark, who is standing across the room, is a
philosopher. Steve thinks Mark is drinking a martini, but we know Mark is drink-
ing something else in a martini glass. Does accepting the premises in (22) commit
one to accepting the conclusion?
⁵See, e.g., Schlenker 2003, Amaral et al. 2007, Potts 2007, Harris & Potts 2009.
⁶See, e.g., Schlenker 2003, Potts 2005, 2007,McCready 2010, Tonhauser etal. 2013,Mur-
ray 2014.
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(22) a. What Steve believes is true.
b. What Steve believes is that themandrinking amartini is a philosopher.
c. ∴Theman drinking a martini is a philosopher.
The description ‘the man drinking a martini’ in (22b) presupposes, roughly, that
a certain maximally salient man, Mark, is drinking a martini. The falsity of this
presupposition, call it P , can interfere with our judgments about whether the ar-
gument is acceptance-preserving. We must test instead for what we might call—
adapting a notion from von Fintel 1999— Strawson-acceptance-preservation: we
check whether the argument is acceptance-preserving given that any projective con-
tents of premises and conclusion are (consistently) satisfied. And indeed, accept-
ing the premises in (22) along with P would commit one to accepting the conclu-
sion. But the same also holds with (17), according to the hybrid theorist: accept-
ing the premises, along with the projective negative attitude associated with ‘wrong’
in (17b)–(17c), commits one to accepting the conclusion. Requiring that (17) be
acceptance-preserving in the general non-Strawsonified sense would be question-
begging.
For all the discussions in the volume of pejoratives and the potential advantages
of going hybrid for responding to the Frege-Geach problem, there is a conspicuous
absence of sustained, rigorous linguistic inquiry into the specific relation between
the descriptive and expressive meaning components, how they are represented in
the compositional semantics, etc. This is unfortunate given the rich empirical and
formal research in linguistic semantics investigating precisely these sorts of issues
(n. 6). Though the analogy with pejoratives may be problematic, perhaps one could
maintain a hybrid theory associatingmoral predicateswith projective general desire-
like attitudes, where this projective content has obligatory local effect. The lack of
projection in (7)–(9) could be attributed to the fact that the projective content can-
not be taken for granted in the discourse. Compare: the existence implication typ-
ically associated with ‘the king of France’ likewise doesn’t project in (23) where the
question under discussion is whether France has a king.
(23) A: Does France have a king?
B: The king of France wasn’t at the royal gala. (So, maybe not.)
We need a more comprehensive investigation of projection phenomena with the va-
rieties of moral terms—and not just with thin moral terms like ‘wrong’. Detailed
comparison with various types of linguistic expressives and other classes of projec-
tive contents is required.
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2. Implicature
It is common to treat the projective, attitudinal component of linguistic expressives
as a (Pottsian) conventional implicature. However, Guy Fletcher’s paper argues
that the putative attitudinal implications associated with uses of moral terms pat-
tern instead with (generalized) conversational implicatures— specifically, in being
reenforceable, detachable, cancelable, and calculable. The alleged contrasts Fletcher
draws between moral terms and expressives strike me as problematic. Many of the
issues are more complex than Fletcher’s discussion lets on.
Reinforceability: Fletcher offers the following contrast:
(24) a. Chelsea has signed that kraut Ballack. #I have derogatory attitudes
toward German people.
b. This fucking printer cost £200. #I am angry about the printer.
(25) Waterboarding terror suspects is wrong. I’d resent anyone who did so and
feel guilty if I did.
(181–82)
However, the continuations in (24) don’t adequately express the attitudinal contents
of ‘kraut’ and ‘fucking’. (Compare: ‘Everyone failed. #Also, someone failed.’) The
examples in (26) seem more analogous with those in (25).
(26) a. Chelsea has signed that kraut Ballack. I can’t stand Germans.
b. This fucking printer cost £200. I hate it!
The second sentences, though perhaps redundant in some sense, arguably provide
felicitous continuations of the attitudes expressed in the first. (Compare: ‘This is an
electron. It has negative charge.’)
Nondetachability: Fletcher claims that whereas the truth-conditional content of
(27a) can be conveyed without expressing the problematic attitude, as in (27b), any
way of conveying the truth-conditional content of (28a) expresses a negative attitude,
as reflected in (28b).
(27) a. Chelsea has signed that kraut Ballack.
b. Chelsea has signed that German Ballack.
(28) a. Waterboarding terror suspects is wrong.
b. It’s wrong to waterboard terror suspects. (183)
It is puzzling why Fletcher assumes that candidate non-implicature-generating ana-
logues of (28a) must also use a moral term. Suppose ‘wrong’ denotes the property
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of failing to maximize overall happiness. Then (29) has the same truth-conditions
as (28a) but needn’t generate the attitudinal implicature.
(29) Waterboarding terror suspects fails to maximize overall happiness.
Cancelability: Fletcher claims that attitude expression with moral terms, unlike
with expressives, is cancelable:
(30) Chelsea has signed that kraut Ballack. #I have nothing against German
people. (187)
(31) You say that it’s morally wrong and you’re absolutely right about that. But
I don’t care about what’s morally right and wrong; I just want to make as
much money and have as much fun as possible. It’s not illegal. So lets do
it and keep it quiet. Anyone who passed up this kind of opportunity is a
sucker. (189)
Though Fletcher acknowledges several complications in testing for cancelability, the
issues are still more complex than the discussion lets on. It’s well-known that modal
expressions can be used “non-endorsingly,” i.e. used without presenting the speaker
as endorsing the relevant considerations that would verify the modal claim, as in
(32).⁷
(32) Ernie has to be home by 10. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I were
him.
The phenomenon generalizes to other categories of expressions:
(33) This cat food is really tasty. Fluffy eats it right up.
(cf. Stephenson 2007)
Recent discussions of expressives provide similar examples with epithets (see n. 5):
(34) I’ve heard similar arguments before: if companies like Symantec or McAfee
make antivirus applications for the Mac, then Macs must truly be vulnera-
ble somehow, somewhere. Steve Jobs and the rest of the Apple cronies must
be lying.
[www.digitaltrends.com/features/antivirus-programs-for-mac-snake-oil-or-
public-service] (in Harris & Potts 2009)
⁷The distinction between endorsing and non-endorsing uses has been noted under various labels
in many areas (see Silk 2014, 2015 for discussion and references).
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It’s contentious how precisely to analyze such examples— e.g., in terms of syntac-
tic/semantic binding, anaphora, pragmatically mediated ‘perspective shifting’, etc.
What is important here is simply that similar apparent “cancelation” phenomena
can be observed with both expressives and moral terms. (Whether it is best under-
stood as a kind of cancelation is another matter.)
Calculability: Fletcher argues that “attitude expression fits a conversational im-
plicature model, as there seem to be numerous ways one could calculate an impli-
cature (that the speaker has the relevant negative desire-like attitude) from their
asserting that something is wrong” (191). For instance, “a speaker’s engaging in dis-
cussion about what is required, permitted, prohibited, or recommended by some
standard makes it likely that she cares about conformity to that standard” (191).
One might have hoped for a more rigorous derivation of the implicature from the
specific truth-conditions, specific maxims, and general features of contexts of use,
but the basic idea is straightforward enough. The problem—as in the discussion
of nondetachability above— is that there are potential complications depending on
one’s views about the truth-conditional content. Suppose ‘wrong’ denotes the prop-
erty of failing to maximize overall happiness. One cannot in general calculate that
the speaker has the relevant negative attitude from the truth-conditions of an utter-
ance of ‘Killing is wrong’, i.e. that killing isn’t happiness-maximizing. Indeed that is
the one of the lessons of Open-Question-style considerations. Compare: one can-
not in general calculate that the speaker has the relevant negative attitude from the
truth-conditions of (1), i.e. that Mark is fromWisconsin.
So, depending on one’s views about the truth-conditional contribution of moral
terms, the respective attitudinal implicatures of uses of moral terms and pejoratives
arguably pattern analogously with respect to reenforceability, nondetachability, can-
celability, and calculability. One might think on this basis that, far from being a
“clear nonstarter” (xiv), conventional implicature views of moral attitude expres-
sion are looking pretty good. But there are other important contrasts (§1).
Fletcher concludes with several objections to generalized conversational impli-
cature views, ultimately favouring (what he regards as) a non-implicaturist, non-
hybrid alternative. It is hard to see why his arguments wouldn’t overgeneralize to
show that no expressions give rise to generalized conversational implicatures. For
instance, Fletcher argues that conversational implicature views cannot capture how
eavesdroppers infer the desire-like attitudes of speakers who are talking to them-
selves: “There is no reason to expect people to adhere to the cooperative princi-
ple when, by their lights, they are not communicating with anyone.… More im-
portantly… [the speaker] has no beliefs about what her hearer can work out. She
believes that she is alone and may not believe anything about [the eavesdropper’s]
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competencies. Thus implicature cannot be the means by which [the eavesdropper]
learns of [the speaker’s] desire-like attitudes” (193). Nothing in this argument turns
on features specific to uses of moral terms.
3. The remaining papers
I will close with brief remarks on the remaining papers, followed by a summary
conclusion.
Ridge: Michael Ridge’s paper defends a cognitivist hybrid theory of ‘rational’.
The cognitivist core is provided by an instrumentalist conception of rationality: ‘S’s
-ing is rationally permissible’ means that it is compatible with S’s “adherence to
those norms that an agent must be taken to adhere, for the most part, and absent
some special explanation, in order for the idea that the agent is rational (in the capac-
ity sense) to be intelligible” (9). (What if there isn’t a unique such set of norms? What
is the upshot of defining non-gradable expressions like ‘(im)permissible’, ‘required’,
etc. in terms of gradable notions of intelligibility? Why think the instrumentalist
conception has become conventionalized in the lexical semantics of ‘rational’?) The
“hybrid ‘twist”’ is provided by a generalized conversational implicature: in deliber-
ative contexts,
Intuitively, in saying that the option in question would be irrational
without any further caveats or commentary, I am thereby advising my
interlocutor against choosing that option. However, it would be in-
sincere for me to advise you to do something if I did not think it was
the thing to do… So insofar as I am being a cooperative interlocutor,
one can derive from standard Griceanmaxims of relevance and the like
that I do indeed believe that my interlocutor ought to act accordingly.
This in turn can explain why such an utterance expresses a proattitude
[sic]… Insofar as I ammyself rational… I will be motivated to perform
[sic] such an action if I find myself in his or her circumstances. (17)
Further details concerning how the attitudinal implicature is calculated from the
specific truth-conditions and maxims are not provided.
Boisvert: Daniel Boisvert argues that we should reject truth-conditional seman-
tics anddevelop hybridism in the context of a “success-conditional semantics” (SCS),
which associates sentences with the conditions under which they would be “success-
ful” (true, complied with, or sincere, depending on the sentence type). It would be
unfortunate to abandon everything which truth-conditional semantics has taught
us in light of cursory dismissals such as these:
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[N]either nondeclaratives nor sentences containing themare truth evalu-
able; consequently sentences of neither type have truth conditions; con-
sequently constructing a truth theory to help explain our understanding
of these types of sentences appears bound to fail. (23)
SCS can, while truth-conditional semantics cannot, explain the intu-
itive validity and invalidity of a variety of different kinds of logical tran-
sitions, including those across moods. (37)
It’s as if the decades of research developing broadly truth-conditional semantics for
interrogatives and imperatives never happened (Hamblin, Karttunen, Groenendijk
& Stokhof, Ginzburg, Roberts, Han, Portner, etc.).
Copp: David Copp defends his cognitivist hybrid theory, developed in previous
work, against two objections: first, that it cannot capture the element of endorsement
in moral thought; second, that it cannot capture the “inference-licensing property”
of valid arguments (roughly, that accepting the premises commits one to accepting
the conclusion). On the latter point, Copp argues against Schroeder 2009 that
the inference-licensing property isn’t in fact a general feature of valid arguments.
Copp offers counterexamples with pejoratives: for any pejorative ‘P*’, the argument
schema in (35) is semantically valid, in the sense that any world where the premise
is true is a world where the conclusion is true; but accepting the premise doesn’t
commit one to the negative attitude projecting in the conclusion.
(35) a. Everything Anna thinks is true.
b. ∴ If Anna thinks Brenda is P*, Brenda is P*. (64–65)
Aworry is that we have independent evidence— linguistic evidence concerning dif-
ferences in projection and local effects— that the analogous arguments with moral
predicates are acceptance-preserving. However, there are other strategies for reply-
ing to Schroeder’s (2009) argument (see §1).
Hay: Many hybrid theories treat all uses of moral terms as expressing the same
“general desire,” as to do what is morally right/wrong/etc., whatever it is. Ryan Hay
argues that treating general desires as attitudes “toward types rather than proposi-
tions involving universals” (i.e., universal generalizations; 76) better captures the
relation between agents’ beliefs and desires and hence between moral judgment and
motivation. Although Hay objects to several “interpretations involving the scope of
the agent’s desire and the universal quantifier” (83), one option he doesn’t seem to
consider is this: For each world w in the agent S’s doxastic alternativesDoxS (worlds
compatible with S’s beliefs), let Dw be the ordinary descriptive property denoted by
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(say) ‘wrong’ in w, and let RS;w be the set of most desired worlds w′ given the rel-
evant facts in w. We might represent the “Generality Requirement” that S desires
not to do whatever is morally wrong via the following structural constraint on S’s
attitudes: for every w ∈ DoxS, every w′ ∈ RS;w is such that S doesn’t perform any acts
which are Dw in w′. If S believes that stealing is wrong (“Belief Requirement”), then
for every w ∈ DoxS, stealing is Dw in w. So, given the Generality Requirement, for
every w ∈ DoxS, every w′ ∈ RS;w is such that S doesn’t steal in w′, i.e. that S desires
not to steal (“Resultant Requirement”). This would seem to satisfy Hay’s three Re-
quirements, and reflect how general desires can interact with beliefs so as to lead to
motivation in specific moral judgments.
Tresan: Jon Tresan defends a “diachronic” hybrid theory, according to which
“when we use moral terms for moralizing, they have the realist [i.e., descriptive]
meaning… But when we use them for metamoralizing they have an attitudinal or
functionalmeaning along the lines posited by emotivists and antirealist expressivists.
For instance, ‘they think dancing is morally wrong’ ascribes to ‘them’ a certain sort
of negative orientation to dancing” (99). The view seems to be thatmoral terms have
one meaning in asserted contexts, and a different meaning when embedded under
attitude verbs. This kind of violation of compositionality and “semantic innocence”
is typically regarded as a reductio of semantic theories.
Finlay: StephenFinlay’s paper defends a “quasi-expressivist” account of discourse
disagreement with normative language. On Finlay’s “end-relational” contextualist
semantics (developed extensively in other work), speakers uttering normative sen-
tences ‘’ and ‘No, ¬’ often assert consistent propositions about their respective
information and/or ends. What explains the speakers’ disagreement are “conflict-
ing preferences that are pragmatically expressed by asserting [these] logically consis-
tent normative propositions” (125). In motivating his contextualist account Finlay
notes that speakers don’t always evaluate normative claims with respect to their own
current information/ends. While I agree that this raises a prima facie worry for rel-
ativism and (pure) expressivism, the fact that normative claims sometimes receive
intuitively contextualist readings has been granted by all parties in the broader lit-
erature (pace Finlay’s suggestions on 130, 145).⁸ The question is at what level to
explain how conversational factors are affecting interpretation—e.g., whether they
are affecting the determination of content from character, or whether a relativist vs.
contextualist pronoun figures in the syntax, among other options. The central chal-
lenges for contextualism remain—most pressingly, in my view, to explain the sys-
tematic contrasts between (e.g.) normative language and paradigm context-sensitive
⁸Cf. Stephenson 2007, MacFarlane 2014, Moss 2015.
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expressions. (Why do speakers systematically assert “normative propositions” they
don’t have a “fundamental interest” in (133)? Why do we systematically use nor-
mative terms, unlike paradigm context-sensitive expressions, to communicate in-
formation about the features of context on which their contents depend? Why…)
The force of these challenges has been underappreciated among contextualists.⁹
Eriksson: John Eriksson’s paper considers how (hybrid) expressivism should un-
derstand meaning in general. The central move is to deny that expressivism needs
to “explain the meaning of a sentence by appeal to its expressing a particular belief ”
or desire-like attitude (162; cf. 169); rather, meaning should be explained in terms of
“more basic states of mind”—namely, a “thought” (160–62) in the case of descrip-
tive meaning, and “entertaining a plan or determination of what to do” (165) in the
case of nondescriptive meaning. This is to avoid “the traditional problem with ex-
pressivism” (155) that complex sentences needn’t express the attitudes that would be
expressed by their constituent clauses considered on their own. If Eriksson’s point is
that expressivists should treat the meanings of expressions in terms of their contri-
bution to the attitude expressed, I would have thought expressivists have been doing
this since Hare 1970.
Barker: Stephen Barker’s paper argues against conventional implicaturist hy-
brid theories. Barker argues that the conventional implicatures associated with “a
range of locutions and constructions” (200) require pure expressivist treatments.
(Barker focuses exclusively on ‘even’.) Since the required “pure cognitivist expres-
sivist” framework can be applied to moral language, going hybrid is otiose. Barker’s
paper fails to advance our understanding of conventional implicature. For instance,
the initial sections examine whether conventional implicature can be “reduc[ed]”
(205) to semantic presupposition, “secondary propositional content,” or pragmatic
presupposition. An alleged feature of Barker’s positive view is that it “explains im-
plicating’s presuppositional status” (209). It’s hard to know what to make of this: the
consensus is that conventional implicatures are to be distinguished from presuppo-
sitions and other kinds of projective contents. On Barker’s positive view, what dis-
tinguishes assertion from (conventionally?) implicating is that “In an assertion the
speaker’s purpose is to manifest a defensive stance with respect to [a mental state]
P, and in an implicative act it is merely to manifest the state” (208). Not enough is
said about “defending” vs. merely “manifesting” mental states to generate testable
predictions. Natural questions include: What distinguishes assertions/implicatures
from questions or imperatives? (Intuitively, my uttering ‘Will it stop?’ manifests
⁹See my 2014 for elaboration on these points and development of a contextualist theory which
begins to address them.
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(a disposition to defend) my mental state of wanting to know whether it will stop.)
Why would “merely manifesting” a mental state lead to backgrounding or (the va-
rieties of) projection phenomena?
Bar-On, Chrisman, & Sias (BCS): BCS’s paper develops Bar-On & Chrisman’s
(2009) “ethical neo-expressivism,” on which ethical claims express propositions and
motivational attitudes, but in two different senses of ‘express’: it is ethical sentences
which semantically express (“s-express”) propositions (i.e., have propositions as their
semantic contents), and uses of ethical sentences (i.e., utterances qua acts) which
express (“a-express”) motivational attitudes. It isn’t clear to me how simply mark-
ing the s-/a-express distinction advances the dialectic. The expressivist strategy, I
take it, is to explain the semantics, or conventional meaning, in terms of use—
in BCS’s terms, to explain the meaning of a sentence S fundamentally in terms of
the attitude conventionally a-expressed in using S, rather than in terms of any con-
tent s-expressed by S. The central move is to do away with treating a notion of s-
expression as playing a fundamental explanatory role. Gibbard, for instance, still
semantically associates sentences with (s-expressed) contents; he just denies that
these (s-expressed) contents fundamentally explain the sentences’ semantic prop-
erties. Likewise, the expressivist agrees with BCS in treating having the relevant
motivating attitude as a “propriety condition on making (genuinely) ethical claims”
(240), but simply treats this condition as conventionalized.
Schroeter & Schroeter (SS): SS argue that applying their general bindingmodel of
concepts to normative concepts opens up a way for pure cognitivism to capture the
connection between normative judgment and motivation. Though being motivated
to act in accordance with one’s normative judgments isn’t necessary for conceptual
competence, having such motivational dispositions is crucial in constituting nor-
mal conceptual competence with our shared normative concepts and in fixing their
reference. SS’s paper is refreshing. It draws fruitful connections with broader work
on concept determination and individuation. One issue: SS argue that an adequate
account of normative concepts must capture how one’s various token attitudes de-
ploying a particular normative concept “strike the subject as pertaining de jure to
the same [normative] topic” (252). A worry is that, absent an account of the na-
ture of the attitude of “seeing as pertaining de jure to the same topic” in normative
thoughts, SS’s account is neutral on questions of (non-)cognitivism or motivational
internalism/externalism. For all SS argue, “keep[ing] track of sameness of norma-
tive topic among our thoughts” (251) might essentially involve being in a certain
motivational state.
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4. Conclusion
Let’s return to our initial “tale of two assessments.” As usual with these sorts of
things, the truth is somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, hybridism high-
lights the potential for fruitful cross-disciplinary connections and new directions for
future research. There are interesting questions raised by hybridism. Among them:
• What is the nature of fundamental semantic explanation? Should meaning be
explained fundamentally in terms of contents/truth? Or states of mind?
• Do normative sentences have a descriptive component to their conventional
meaning? Do normative uses of language conventionally express desire-like
attitudes? If ‘yes’ to both, how are the dual descriptive+expressive aspects of
meaning to be implemented in a compositional grammar?
• What are the similarities/differences among various linguistic expressives and
paradigmatic normative expressions— e.g., concerning projection, local ef-
fects, discourse/information structure, felicity conditions?
• How are normative judgments responsive to ordinary features of the world
and subjects’ beliefs about them? How does the connection to motivation in
normative judgment relate to affective coding in judgment more generally?
Substantial progress has beenmade onmany of themore general issues. Yet precisely
for this reason the volume is often frustrating. There is nearly no engagement with
relevant broader research, and the issues are often more complex than the discus-
sions let on. The reader is left thinking that there are exciting developments on the
horizon, just not here. Don’t get me wrong; cross-disciplinary work is hard, indeed
daunting. But we can do better, metaethics. We must.
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